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The legitimation crisis of democracy: emancipatory
politics, the environmental state and the glass ceiling
to socio-ecological transformation
Ingolfur Blühdorn
Institute for Social Change and Sustainability (IGN), Vienna University of Economics and
Business, Austria
ABSTRACT
The democratic legitimation imperative of the modern state has been concep-
tualised as the barrier that stops the environmental state from developing into
a green or eco-state – and thus as the glass ceiling to a socio-ecological
transformation of capitalist consumer democracies. Here, I suggest that this
state-theoretical explanation of the glass ceiling needs to be supplemented by
an analysis of why democratic norms and procedures, which had once been
regarded as essential for any socio-ecological transformation, suddenly appear
as one of its main obstacles. I conceptualise the new eco-political dysfunction-
ality of democracy as one dimension of a more encompassing legitimation crisis
of democracywhich, in turn, has triggered a profound transformation of democ-
racy. Ultimately, exactly this transformation constitutes the glass ceiling to the
socio-ecological restructuring of capitalist consumer societies. It changes
democracy into a tool for the politics of unsustainability, in which the legitima-
tion-dependent state is a key actor.
KEYWORDS Legitimation crisis; dysfunctionality of democracy; dialectics of emancipation; democratic
parabola; politics of unsustainability
Introduction
The tide of right-wing populist movements throughout Europe, the Trump
presidency in the US and the new priority that, since the great banking,
ﬁnancial and economic crisis of 2008/9, virtually all national governments
have given to economic growth at the expense of environmental, climate-
related and social justice commitments signals that – for the time being, at
least – the project of a socio-ecological transformation of capitalist consumer
societies has hit a glass ceiling (Hausknost 2017, in press). The ideal of
a socially and ecologically sustainable society continues to be debated, of
course, and mounting evidence of a multi-dimensional sustainability crisis
(economic, social, ecological, political) actually seems to render the project
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more exigent than ever. Yet, so far this crisis has led neither to the end of
capitalism (Streeck 2014, 2016, Mason 2015) nor – despite the crushing social
impact of neoliberal austerity policies – to any new social contract for
sustainability (WBGU, German Advisory Council on Global Change 2011)
but, instead, to the installation of right wing (coalition-)governments that
have launched a head-on attack on the eco-democratic project and the
cosmopolitan spirit of emancipatory social movements and political parties.
Rather than the envisaged great transformation (WBGU, German Advisory
Council on Global Change 2011), capitalist consumer societies seem to be
witnessing a great regression (Geiselberger 2017), and the politics of unsus-
tainability (Blühdorn 2000, 2011a, 2013b, 2014) appears to be even more
deeply entrenched than before.
Daniel Hausknost, who ﬁrst introduced the concept of a ‘glass ceiling to
environmental transformation’ (Hausknost 2017, p. 50), makes an innova-
tive and important contribution to theorising the inability of capitalist
consumer democracies to overcome their multiple sustainability crisis in
that he supplements the well-established post-Marxist narrative (powerful
economic elites consistently block this transformation) and the equally well-
established institutionalist perspective (the development of political institu-
tions has not kept pace with the ever rising scale and complexity of environ-
mental problems) with a new state-theoretical approach. Drawing on
Skocpol’s notion of state imperatives (Skocpol 1979) and more recent work
on the environmental, green or eco-state (e.g. Dryzek et al. 2003, Barry and
Eckersley 2005, Christoﬀ 2005, Meadowcroft 2012), Hausknost suggests that
the modern state – in order to secure its own stability and survival – needs to
comply with a number of imperatives including, inter alia, the economic
growth imperative and the (democratic) legitimation imperative. He argues
that in order to transform the environmental state into a green or eco-state
that no longer conﬁnes itself to policies of ecological modernisation, but co-
ordinates a transition to ‘a qualitatively new type of society’ (Hausknost
2017, p. 50) beyond the prevailing sustainability crisis, conservation and
sustainability would have to become a state imperative in their own right,
on a par with, or even superior to, the already established state imperatives.
Yet, rather than being an independent imperative, conservation and sustain-
ability remain subordinate to the legitimation imperative: whilst the need to
secure democratic legitimacy does indeed render it imperative for the mod-
ern state to address the multi-dimensional sustainability crisis, it must do so
only in ways that, and only to the extent that, this does not conﬂict with other
state imperatives and citizen expectations (e.g. internal security, interna-
tional competitiveness, economic prosperity, ample consumer choice) that
are equally important for the state’s legitimation and stability. Thus, the
modern state is expected to deliver protection from environmental risks, to
guarantee public health and to secure a high quality of life, but it must not
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pursue any agendas of societal transformation that might negatively aﬀect
other dimensions of what citizens perceive as their quality of life. Least of all
must the state interfere with the freedom, choice, consumer behaviour, and
lifestyles of self-determined individuals. Exactly this, Hausknost suggests,
constitutes the glass ceiling to socio-ecological transformation.
This state-theoretical analysis is provocative in that it relates the glass
ceiling to the socio-ecological transformation of capitalist consumer societies
directly to their democratic order and explicitly addresses the contentious
issue that democracy and democratisation, rather than being the centrepiece
of any solution to the multiple sustainability crises, may in fact themselves be
a constitutive part of the problem (Shearman and Smith 2007, Dean 2009,
Blühdorn 2011b). Yet, Hausknost’s discussion of the democratic legitimation
imperative raises questions about the criteria on the basis of which citizens
either endow state institutions and policies with democratic legitimacy or
deny it. Put diﬀerently, the glass ceiling to a socio-ecological transformation
is, ultimately, not located at the level of the environmental state but at the
level of the interests, norms, and value preferences that make democratic
majorities support or reject transformative agendas. Therefore, the state-
theoretical approach to understanding the glass ceiling to the socio-
ecological transformation of liberal consumer societies needs to be supple-
mented by an investigation of the social norms and value preferences pre-
vailing in these societies; Hausknost’s conceptualisation in terms of the
state’s democratic legitimation imperative needs to be backed up by a more
encompassing analysis of why democratic procedures, which environmental
movements had always regarded as an essential tool for, and prerequisite to,
any socio-ecological transformation, now suddenly appear as one of its main
obstacles.
Here, I aim to work towards just that. I conceptualise this new eco-political
dysfunctionality of democracy as one dimension of a more encompassing
legitimation crisis of democracy. This legitimation crisis, I suggest, is
a modernisation-induced phenomenon and has triggered a profound trans-
formation of prevalent understandings of democracy – which radically
challenges established beliefs about the relationship between democracy
and ecology. Indeed, in the wake of its ongoing metamorphosis, democracy
not only becomes the glass ceiling to the socio-ecological transformation
envisaged by radical environmentalists, but it turns into a powerful tool for
the prevailing politics of unsustainability. The next section further explores
the striking recent erosion of eco-political conﬁdence in democracy and the
irritating suggestion that there may, in fact, be a kind of ‘complicity’
(Eckersley 2017, p. 3) of liberal democracy, in particular, in the politics of
unsustainability. I then place this eco-political loss of conﬁdence into the
context of the crisis of democracy more generally, which is conceptualised in
terms of a dialectic that renders democracy unsustainable and dysfunctional –
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not just in an ecological sense and not only liberal democracy. I then explore
the metamorphosis of democracy that is induced by this dialectic and
investigates democracy’s transformation into a tool for the politics of unsus-
tainability. The concluding section reﬂects on the challenges this entails for
critical (eco-)sociology.
Eco-political dysfunctionality
The suggestion that the environmental state’s dependence on democratic
legitimation may constitute the glass ceiling to a socio-ecological transforma-
tion of modern capitalist consumer societies is irritating. After all, political
ecologists have always assumed that democracy and democratisation are an
essential precondition for, and pathway towards, socio-economic sustainabil-
ity, ecological integrity and a good life for all. Emancipatory social movements
have campaigned to expose and remove democratic deﬁcits, and have con-
ceptualised the achievement of authentic democracy and ecological goals as
two inseparable, equally important dimensions of their political project. When
in the 1980s issues of environmental protection became mainstreamed and
increasingly institutionalised, the belief that any societal transformation
towards sustainability can only be a democratic transformation became one
of the orthodoxies of modern eco-politics. Incremental, ﬂexible, participatory,
decentralised and consensus-seeking policy networks not only supplemented,
but in many instances actually replaced traditional-style centralised, interven-
tionist, regulatory environmental politics. Radical demands for the scope and
depth of democratisation to be increased well beyond the standards of liberal,
aggregative, representative democracy remained largely unfulﬁlled (e.g.
Dryzek 2000, Eckersley 2004). Still, democratic participation has become an
uncontested principle of environmental good governance (Newig 2007,
Bäckstrand et al. 2010, Fischer 2017, Blühdorn and Deﬂorian 2019).
Over the past decade, however, there has also been a growing number of
voices urging that environmentalists end their ‘love aﬀair with democracy’
(Shearman and Smith 2007, p. 121). In line with the more encompassing
concern that in the era of neoliberalism, democracy and democratisation
may have become ‘inadequate as a language and frame for left political
aspiration’ (Dean 2009, p. 20), and that today to struggle for more democracy
essentially means to struggle ‘for more of the same’ (p. 24), there is also
a notable decline of eco-political conﬁdence in democracy. Concerns that the
multi-dimensional sustainability crisis is swiftly evolving into a formidable
sustainability emergency, that leading democratic polities such as the USA,
Canada, and Australia consistently appear as eco-political laggards, that
right-wing populist movements invoke democracy to legitimate policies
that are ecologically and socially destructive have, along with the rise of
China as a signiﬁcant player in global climate politics, reawakened
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widespread ‘interest in non-democratic approaches to environmentalism as
an alternative environmental policy model’ (Chen and Lees 2018, p. 2).
Whilst ‘standard liberal democratic institutions and practices’, in particular,
are increasingly regarded as categorically ‘ill-suited to managing the bound-
less character of world risks’ (Eckersley 2017: 9, my emphasis), the strong,
non-democratic state is, once again, ascribed the potential to ‘achieve poli-
tical feats unimaginable in liberal democracy’ (Wainwright and Mann 2013,
p. 10). A range of eco-political weaknesses of democracy (such as its slow
pace, its ﬁxation on the present, or its inability to represent those who don’t
have a voice or a vote) had been debated for a long time (Blühdorn 2011b,
2013b, Fischer 2017), yet the more recent literature has raised two more
fundamental points that help to explain the erosion of eco-political con-
ﬁdence in democracy and the remarkable rehabilitation of environmental
authoritarianism (Beeson 2010) and authoritarian environmentalism (Chen
and Lees 2018). One of them is the dependence of liberal representative
democracy on the fossil-based industrial growth economy with which it
historically co-evolved, the other that democracy and democratisation are
continuously chipping away at the normative foundations and authority of
modern eco-politics.
The concern that modern democracy is based on material foundations,
and relies on – and drives – the essentially unrestricted appropriation and
exploitation of resources, which are ﬁnite and non-renewable, reaches well
beyond the question for the suitability of democratic institutions and pro-
cesses as a tool for achieving eco-political goals. Indeed, it aﬀects the sustain-
ability of democracy itself, i.e. its long-term ability to reproduce and stabilize
itself. For a long time, this issue had been neglected by both eco-political and
democratic theorists. Only in recent years, Mitchell (2011), Malm (2016) and
various others (e.g. Hausknost 2017, Pichler et al. in press) – also including
Hausknost in this volume – have called to mind the material foundations of
the democratic project, which renders it eco-politically problematic. Yet, at
least as important for the change in the relationship between ecology and
democracy, though much less debated, is the second of the above points: the
erosive eﬀect ongoing processes of democratization have on the normative
foundations of modern eco-politics. What is at stake here is what Hausknost
(2017) calls the independent sustainability imperative, the unavailability of
which not only aﬀects the environmental state but all other eco-political
actors, too.
For a long time, environmental movements had assumed that environ-
mental problems, the need for transformative action and the key policy
measures that are required are essentially self-evident, and that campaigns
of public information, education, awareness raising and consciousness build-
ing, reinforced by the steady deterioration of environmental conditions
would, at some point, almost automatically trigger transformative action at
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all levels of society to confront the realities that would then be overwhelming
and undeniable. Up to the present, environmentalists keep reiterating that
for modern consumer societies the continuation of the status quo is simply
not an option, that there are scientiﬁcally identiﬁable and objectively valid
planetary boundaries that must not be transgressed (Rockström et al. 2009),
and that modern eco-politics will inescapably have to evolve into a form of
earth system management guided by these indisputable boundaries
(Biermann 2012; Rockström 2015). Yet, ﬁrstly, environmental politics is
not primarily about scientiﬁcally measurable facts, but, more than anything,
about social concerns (Luhmann 1989, Latour 1993, 2004, Blühdorn 2000);
secondly, modern environmental movements have not only ﬁrmly relied on
science to provide objective foundations for eﬀective eco-politics, but their
agenda of epistemic democratisation has unceasingly challenged the very
objectivity that science was supposed to provide.
Indeed, worried about the close interrelation of modern science and the
capitalist growth economy, emancipatory social movements have consis-
tently pushed the public contestation of scientiﬁc problem diagnoses and
the related policy recommendations. Driven by concerns about science being
a tool in the hands of exclusive power elites, about the depoliticising eﬀect of
the scientisation of eco-politics and about the spectre of post-democratic
expert rule, they demanded to democratise the ways in which problems are
framed and policy approaches devised (Bäckstrand 2004). Aiming for a more
complex and inclusive understanding of environmental issues (Kitcher 2001,
2011), seeking to bridge the gap between science and society and hoping to
improve the eﬀectiveness, legitimacy and implementability of evidence-
based policy making, emancipatory movements demanded abstract scientiﬁc
knowledge to be supplemented by embedded, practical real-world knowl-
edges of diﬀerent kinds and communities. Supported by STS scholars and the
proponents of post-normal science (Irwin 1995, Ravetz 1999, Wynne 2005,
Jasanoﬀ 2005, 2012), they argued that the validity of expert assessments and
the related policy recommendations always remain limited to the relevant
epistemic communities and therefore demanded socially inclusive research
practices giving appropriate recognition to lay-knowledges, the knowledge of
indigenous peoples and traditions, citizen experts, experts by experience,
artists, aﬀected communities and so forth. Their social accounts of objectivity
put emphasis on the contextual nature of all truth and objectivity. Yet, this
democratisation of science, scientiﬁc research and scientiﬁc knowledge also
politicised the authority of scientiﬁc diagnoses, relativized the validity of
ecological imperatives and propelled the proliferation of eco-political
uncertainty.
Up to the present there is some hope that ‘the democratisation of science
has a neglected potential to contribute to the democratisation of global envir-
onmental policy’ (Berg and Lidskog 2018, p. 3, 16). A ‘more democratically
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orchestrated co-production of knowledge’, Eckersley argues, might not only
expose ‘the complicity of liberal democracy in undermining Earth systems
processes’, but also provide a basis for ‘a more reﬂexive democratic political
culture’ that is ‘more attentive to links with other socio-ecological communities
and larger Earth system processes’ (Eckersley 2017, p. 14, 3). But as processes of
modernisation (and democratisation) render contemporary societies ever
more complex and liquid (Bauman 2000, Rosa 2013), giving rise to an ever
larger number of ever more changeable perspectives on reality, ever more
diverse notions of truth and competing views of what ought to be sustained, for
whom, for what reason and so forth, there is mounting evidence that the
democratisation of scientiﬁc knowledge is at least as disabling and paralysing,
eco-politically, as it may have unused potentials to unlock (Koskinen 2017).
And as right-wing populists – in the name of common sense and the people –
are pursuing their agnotological project (Proctor 2008) of discrediting science,
establishing so-called alternative facts, and rebuilding political discourse
around fabricated fears, the normative foundations of eco-politics are becom-
ing ever more uncertain.
Thus, in addition to the problem that democracy and democratisation
seem to propel the appropriation of nature and exploitation of ﬁnitematerial
resources, emancipatory social movements, including the environmental
movement have, unwittingly, also contributed to the depletion of indispen-
sable normative resources, thus adding another layer to the eco-political
dysfunctionality of democracy and reinforcing the glass ceiling to the socio-
ecological transformation of modern societies. Against the backdrop of
epistemic democratisation, a coordinated and eﬀective politics of interven-
tion, regulation and transformation becomes an ever less realistic prospect,
which, as yet, neither reforms to existing democratic institutions nor sugges-
tions of more authentically democratic alternatives to liberal democracy have
been able to brighten. For, as yet, such reforms or alternative models have
not been able to oﬀer any empirically eﬀective or sociologically convincing
antidote to the centrifugal forces this democratisation has unleashed. In
a dialectical fashion, democracy and democratisation thus seem to be meta-
morphosing from a much-celebrated tool and assumed precondition for any
socio-ecological transformation into one of the main obstacles to it.
The dialectic of emancipation and the democratic parabola
For a fuller understanding of this dialectic (Blühdorn in press), to further explore
how and why democracy itself turns into the glass ceiling to transformative
politics, the discussion of its eco-political dysfunctionality needs to be placed in
the wider context of the debate on the crisis of democracy more generally (e.g.
Crouch 2004, Mair 2006, Wilson and Swyngedouw 2014). Taking
a modernisation- and subject-theoretical approach, I have conceptualised this
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crisis as the post-democratic turn (Blühdorn 2000, 2007, 2013a, b). It implies that
in advanced modern societies, democratic norms, as traditionally understood,
are becoming exhausted – or at least highly ambivalent and are perceived as
a threat at least as much as a promise. Further pursuing this line of enquiry, this
new ambivalence may also be conceptualised in terms of a modernisation-
induced triple dysfunctionality of democracy. Adapting and expanding Fuchs’
distinction between the systemic performance (problem solving capacity) and
democratic performance (ability to deliver to speciﬁcally democratic expecta-
tions) of political systems (Fuchs 1998, Roller 2005), this ambivalence may be
said to derive from: democracy’s systemic dysfunctionality – its insuﬃcient
problem solving capacities; its emancipatory dysfunctionality – its unsuitability
as a tool speciﬁcally for the project of self-determination and self-realisation; and
what might be described as mechanical dysfunctionality – its breakdown due to
the corrosion of structural parts on which it vitally depends. This triple dysfunc-
tionality is not conﬁned to liberal democracy, but it aﬀects the democratic
project in a much more comprehensive sense.
Of these three dimensions, the ﬁrst – the limited problem-solving capacity
of democracy – not only in eco-political terms, is the best-researched andmost
widely debated. Already in the 1990s, reform governments set out to moder-
nise democratic politics, seeking to increase its eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness in
the new societal conditions. The devolution of responsibilities that the state
had once adopted, the depoliticisation of public policy by means of delegation
to expert committees, and the streamlining of participation, consultation and
decision-making processes were supposed to restore the responsiveness and
quality of democratic policy making (Wood and Flinders 2014). Improved
output-legitimacywas supposed to compensate for the reduction of traditional-
style democratic input-legitimacy (Scharpf 1999). Yet, given the dynamic of
modernisation, these strategies did little to overcome the structural problems
of democracy. Whilst challenges such as social inequality, global warming,
migration or demographic change are becoming ever more complex and
urgent, democratic institutions retain little ability to plan, direct, regulate
and coordinate societal development – least of all to eﬀect the kind of socio-
ecological transformation that ecologists demand.
The emancipatory dysfunctionality of democracy – its increasing unsuit-
ability as a tool for goals of self-determination and self-realisation – derives
from the modernisation-induced shift in prevalent understandings of free-
dom, subjectivity and identity. Elsewhere I have conceptualised this shift as
a process of second-order emancipation (Blühdorn 2013a, b, 2014, 2017) in
which contemporary individuals liberate themselves from established eman-
cipatory norms, ideals and assumptions that in advanced modern societies
appear unduly restrictive. These include, for example: the protestant, bour-
geois and (post-)Marxist assertion that the truly autonomous self can be
realised only beyond, and by resisting, the false promises and superﬁciality of
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the alienating consumer culture (e.g. Marcuse 1972); or the expectation that
the fully emancipated subject will develop a consistent, principled, stable and
unitary identity, personality or character. Eco-politically, this emancipation
from these older notions of subjectivity and identity and the related change
in prevailing patterns of self-realisation – theorized also by Sennett (1999),
Bauman (2000, 2005), Featherstone (2007), Reckwitz (2017) and many
others – implies, inter alia, liberation from supposedly categorical eco-
imperatives and the impossibility of any independent sustainability impera-
tives. In terms of democracy, it implies that democracy and democratisation,
which had once been the most important tool for the emancipatory project,
increasingly turn into a burden and obstacle. For the articulation and
realization of modern understandings of freedom and contemporary aspira-
tions for self-realisation, democratic institutions and processes are structu-
rally inadequate: they can neither articulate nor represent the complexity and
ﬂexibility of modern individuals and their identity needs, nor can they
respond to the dynamics of modern lifestyles and the reality of the compe-
titive struggle for social opportunities. In a societal constellation where the
new understandings of autonomy, subjectivity and identity clash, ever more
openly, with biophysical limits and persistently low economic growth, the
democratic principles of egalitarianism, social justice and social inclusion
become a major obstacle to individual freedom and self-realisation. From the
perspective of contemporary ideals of self-realisation and a good life, the –
increasingly dysfunctional – democratic project must, therefore, be either
abandoned or comprehensively reframed. Egalitarians and ecologists may, of
course, continue to campaign for normative ideals of a more authentically
democratic and more ecologically eﬀective democracy – and there is ample
evidence that they are doing so. But it is getting ever more diﬃcult for these
actors to construct dependable normative foundations for such projects, and
their ability to have a transformative eﬀect is set to decline in line with the
spread of the value- and culture-change conceptualised here as second-order
emancipation.
The third dimension of democratic dysfunctionality, described here as
mechanical dysfunctionality, is directly related to this transformation of
prevailing understandings of autonomy, subjectivity and identity. Yet,
while the previous two forms of dysfunctionality consider the usefulness of
democracy as a tool for a particular purpose, this third dimension concerns
the viability of democracy itself. This viability depends not only, as discussed
above, onmaterial resources that democracy does not reproduce but, at least
as importantly, on non-material, ideational resources that it also depletes
without being able to reproduce. These include, in particular, the
Enlightenment idea of the autonomous subject. Had it not been for this
ideal, neither the emancipatory nor the democratic project would have
evolved. One of the fundamental assumptions underpinning both these
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projects was, from the very outset, that autonomy and subjectivity, liberty
and self-determination, were conceived of as being restricted in multiple
respects. Kant’s famous emergence of mankind from its self-imposed imma-
turity was never supposed to imply the complete removal of all boundaries,
but the achievement ofmaturity – which from Kant to the political ecologists
of the 1980s always denoted a synthesis of freedom and obligation as equally
important constitutive elements.
More speciﬁcally, freedom and self-determination were understood, ﬁrst
and foremost, in an intellectual and moral sense, as inner freedom leading to
dignity and the worthiness to be happy rather than to empirical happiness
and fulﬁlment in an outward and material sense (Kant 1781/1983, p. 813).
Secondly, freedom and self-determination were understood as the rule of
absolute reason (rather than animalistic instinct or instrumental rational-
ities), as restricted by the obligation to consistency, unity, and truth. Third,
the autonomous subject was conceptualized in a collective rather than
individual sense, as limited by the principles of inclusion and equality. For
political ecologists at least, freedom and self-determination were supposed to
also include nature and the environment, to be limited by the imperative to
grant nature the same liberty, dignity and integrity that modernist thinking
ascribes to the human subject. Precisely within these boundaries, deﬁned in
exactly this way, freedom and self-determination became democracy’s nor-
mative point of reference. Or, conversely, democracy evolved as the political
instrument for this particular understanding of freedom and self-
determination. At least this has always been the normative justiﬁcation for
the democratic project, and it became the normative yardstick for the
critique of forms or institutions of democracy that were perceived as socially
and ecologically insuﬃcient, as well as the point of reference for supposedly
superior alternatives. Indeed, democracy can only function, if the autonomy
and subject-status that it is intended to deliver and guarantee are deﬁned and
limited in these particular ways. Put diﬀerently, this particular notion of
autonomy and subjectivity is part of the indispensable prerequisites (idea-
tional resources) on which democracy vitally depends.
By its very nature, however, the emancipatory project could never content
itself with these restrictions; by virtue of being emancipatory, it persistently
challenged all limitations, including those delimiting its own original objectives.
Untiringly, progressive movements fought for the ﬂexibilization of values, of
established truth, of morals, of identity, of subjectivity, of nature, of reason. In
the wake of this struggle, the Kantian emergence from self-imposed immaturity
seamlessly merged into the disposal of the duty to mature, the commitment to
the principles of reason and its constraints on freedom. Incrementally, unin-
tentionally and unwittingly, emancipatory movements thus undermined the
ideational foundations of democracy and depleted the normative resources
without which it cannot survive. Reframing the notions of subjectivity, identity
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and self-realisation as described above, the emancipatory project, which was
once the midwife of democracy, metamorphosed into its gravedigger. By
removing the Kantian boundaries of freedom, by suspending the Kantian
notion of the subject, it renders democracy – liberal, egalitarian, representative,
participatory, or deliberative – dysfunctional in a quite literal, mechanical sense.
To a signiﬁcant extent, the development and fate of democracy are thus
determined by a dialectic of emancipation that, by hollowing out democracy’s
normative core and point of reference, causes a genuine legitimation crisis of
democracy. Incrementally, it renders democracy not only structurally inade-
quate for advanced modern societies, but also normatively questionable.
From the perspective of second-order emancipation, democracy no longer
delivers what contemporary individuals regard as their inalienable rights,
and from the perspective of progressives in a more traditional sense, any
reinvigoration of the democratic project or further democratization of
democracy would, indeed, most likely deliver just ‘more of the same’
(Dean 2009, p. 24). Modernity and democracy are connected, therefore,
not only in that it was modernity – Enlightenment thinking – which gave
birth to the idea of the autonomous subject that, ever since, has been the
beacon and driving force of all progressive-democratic movements, but the
dynamics of modernisation-cum-emancipation also destroy democracy, as
traditionally understood. Hence, the development of democracy can, follow-
ing Crouch (2004), indeed be described in terms of a parabola. But while
Crouch and many others remain conﬁdent that the emancipatory-
democratic project can somehow be revived and the direction of the demo-
cratic parabola reversed (e.g. Mouﬀe 2018), the argument here is that the
dialectic of emancipation and the decline of the democratic project, as the
new social movements had emphatically rearticulated it, can most probably
not be unhinged. This triple dysfunctionality accounts for the widely per-
ceived decline in conﬁdence in democracy, and it powers the reconstruction
of the democratic project on new normative foundations. In the wake of this
reconﬁguration, democracy becomes, more than ever, the glass ceiling to the
socio-ecological transformation of society. Because of this reconﬁguration,
the environmental state, which remains tied by the democratic legitimation
imperative, is ever less likely to ever evolve into an eco- or green state.
Metamorphosis and metastasis
In a curious manner, the dialectic of emancipation delivers exactly what
sustainable development and ecological modernization had always aimed
for and promised: modern societies are modernizing themselves out of their
sustainability crisis (Mol 1995, p. 42). Yet, they are doing so not by devel-
oping techno-managerial solutions to supposedly objective environmental
problems, but – much more importantly – by updating their normative
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yardstick and societal modes of problem perception (framing). They are
shifting the boundaries of the socially acceptable, so as to accommodate the
unavoidable implications of the particular ways in which contemporary
individuals are interpreting their essential needs, inalienable rights, and
non-negotiable freedom of self-realization. In as much as these rights and
values that contemporary individuals regard as inalienable and non-
negotiable are inherently based on the principle of exclusion, in as much
as their realisation and maintenance explicitly acknowledges that they
cannot – must not – be generalised and directly imply that their enjoyment
for some is being paid for by others, the imperial mode of living (Brand and
Wissen 2018) in modern externalisation societies (Lessenich 2019) necessi-
tates a ‘new politics of exclusion’ (Appadurai 2017, p. 8). As economic
growth rates are set to remain low, the ﬁniteness of natural resources
becomes ever more visible, and the social implications of global warming
and bio-physical system collapse are increasingly tangible, this politics of
exclusion, of political measures defending and fortifying existing bound-
aries (national or international), as well as establishing new lines of exclu-
sion, internationally and within national communities, becomes an ever
more urgent and important requirement. Conversely, a re-invigoration of
the ecologist agenda and egalitarian democracy becomes ever less likely.
Activists might continue to campaign for a new social contract for sustain-
ability (WBGU, German Advisory Council on Global Change 2011), but
the reality of eco-politics in modern consumer societies is shaped by
a stronger than ever social contract for sustaining the unsustainable. Or
adopting a conceptual pair once suggested by Jean Baudrillard; in the wake
of modernisation, the old progressive ideal of society’s metamorphosis has
given way to a project of metastasis: ‘the ever more ecstatic production of
variations of the extant’ (Baudrillard 1983, p. 151–152; my translation).
As the value- and culture-shift portrayed here as the post-democratic turn
by no means implies the radical abandonment of all democratic beliefs, this
politics of sustained unsustainability still has to take the form of a democratic
politics. Indeed, despite the multiple dysfunctionality and the legitimation
crisis of democracy, despite the proliferation of anti-democratic feelings
(Rancière 2006) and anti-political sentiments (Mair 2006), and although
contemporary consumer societies show clear symptoms of ‘democratic fati-
gue syndrome’ (van Reybrouck 2016, Appadurai 2017), citizens are making
ever more vociferous claims for democratic participation, representation,
self-determination, and self-realisation. Hence the new politics of exclusion
must be organised in a democratic way; democracy has to evolve into some-
thing categorically new – and the rise of right-wing populism provides
evidence that it is already doing so.
Democracy has always been, of course, but a ﬂoating signiﬁer (Laclau 2005)
and a perennially open project (Dahl 1989), continually redeﬁned in line with
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the norms of subjectivity prevailing in a given polity at any particular point in
time. Hence, democracy has always been highly adaptable, and for the politics
of unsustainability it is particularly suited because it has, in fact, always been
not only ‘a mechanism of inclusion but also of exclusion’ (Krastev 2017, p. 74,
Mouﬀe 2018). Indeed, it is explicitly in the name of the people’s democratic
self-determination and desire to take back control that right-wing populist
movements and governments now back out of international agreements and
structures of governance, relax existing environmental legislation, cut support
for so-called welfare parasites, pursue illiberal and xenophobic agendas, and
vow to always put their respective country ﬁrst. Popular pressure for more
direct democracy propels the transformation of ‘democracy as a regime favour-
ing the emancipation of minorities’ into ‘democracy as a political regime that
secures the power of majorities’ (Krastev 2017, p. 69). These ‘threatened
majorities’ (Krastev 2017, p. 67) are not only the motor of right-wing populist
movements, but in contemporary consumer societies, they are themost power-
ful and agenda-setting political force much more generally (Inglehart and
Norris 2016, 2017, Lilla 2017).
These ‘threatened majorities’ are neither just the often-cited losers of
modernisation that are commonly presented as the core of the populist
revolution (e.g. Oliver and Rahn 2016, Spruyt et al. 2016), nor is their
political agenda well described as ‘a reversal’ of the ‘progressive development’
of earlier decades (Inglehart and Norris 2016, 2017, Krastev 2017,
Geiselberger 2017). Instead, this threatened majority is a broad, inclusive –
and not necessarily openly declared, or even conscious – alliance of diverse
socio-economic groups all sharing the concern that in view of low economic
growth rates, clearly visible bio-physical limits and steadily increasing social
inequality, nationally and internationally, their de-limited understandings of
freedom, self-determination and self-realisation, and the lifestyles and
notions of fulﬁlment that they entertain, or are aspiring to, are under severe
threat. They are determined to defend the achievements and promises of the
emancipatory project, in its contemporary appearance. For this reason,
widespread attempts to conceptualize them as ‘regressive’ (Geiselberger
2017), a ‘cultural backlash’ (Inglehart and Norris 2016), a ‘retrogression’
(Inglehart and Norris 2017) or ‘retrotopia’ (Bauman 2017) are simplistic
(Blühdorn and Butzlaﬀ 2018). From the normative perspective of ﬁrst-order
emancipation, they may, of course, be described as such. Yet, from the
analytical perspective outlined above, they appear as the continuation rather
than reversal of the emancipatory project. The moralising critique of the
‘regressive’ believers in ‘retrotopia’ may well be a discursive strategy to veil
a tacit complicity in (parts of) the project it claims to reject.
The plebiscitary empowerment of this threatened majority is the demo-
cratic tool for the new politics of exclusion. It organises the democratic
deﬁnition and implementation of new lines of demarcation and exclusion
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both within the respective polities and beyond. It suspends established
democratic requirements of detailed information, rational deliberation, and
public justiﬁcation; it abandons the principle of compromise and replaces the
idea of collective reason and reasoning with the articulation and aggregation
of individualistic interests, emotions, and fears. Its objective is to collec-
tively – and democratically – oﬄoad established egalitarian obligations and
ecological commitments so as to keep the cumulative size of the rightful
claim to participation in line with the declining availability of resources and
opportunities. In particular, this implies the democratic suspension of uni-
versal human rights and the inviolable dignity of (wo)man. Thus, contem-
porary consumer societies are witnessing the people’s inclusion into the
politics of exclusion. The democratisation of exclusion executes the (ever
less) tacit social contract for unsustainability. For this purpose the ﬂexible,
decentralised, participative and consensus-oriented practices of stakeholder
governance, which are increasingly replacing centralised, interventionist
environmental government, are proving particularly helpful (Blühdorn and
Deﬂorian 2019). But the threatened majority has also ‘turned the state into its
own private possession’ (Krastev 2017, p. 74), instrumentalising it for the
provision and enforcement of the institutional framework required for the
politics of exclusion. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the democratically legiti-
mated environmental state is structurally unable to develop into a green or
eco-state in Hausknost’s sense. Contrary to any hopes that the crisis of
capitalism or the multiple sustainability crisis might trigger a renewal of
egalitarian democracy and the socio-ecological transformation to sustain-
ability, democracy is, more than ever, the latter’s glass ceiling.
Conclusion
Following extended debates about the decline of the nation state and the
post-national constellation, nation states and national governments are
currently reasserting their power and political steering capacity. Yet, there
is no evidence of this implying that the environmental state may eventually
turn into a green or eco-state. Following up Hausknost’s suggestion that this
may be due to the state’s dependence on the democratic legitimation impera-
tive, I have aimed here to demonstrate that the glass ceiling to this happening
and to the socio-ecological transformation of contemporary consumer socie-
ties may indeed be their ongoing commitment to democracy. Supplementing
Hausknost’s state-theoretical approach, I have adopted a modernisation- and
subject-theoretical approach to show how the dialectic of emancipation has
depleted the normative foundations of the democratic project as emancipa-
tory eco-movements had still conceived it, triggered a profound legitimation
crisis of democracy, and prompted democracy’s radical reconﬁguration so as
to accommodate further increasing claims to self-determination and the
14 I. BLÜHDORN
determined defence of our freedom, our values, and our lifestyles – which are
well known to be socially and ecologically exclusive and destructive. Against
this backdrop, the democratically legitimated environmental state is conﬁned
to organising the new politics of exclusion and societal adaptation to sus-
tained unsustainability. Democracy is not only the glass ceiling to the socio-
ecological transformation that ecologists demand but, in its updated form, it
is a constitutive element of modern societies’ politics of unsustainability and
their resilience to its unavoidable implications.
When in the 1970s Jürgen Habermas (1975) predicted a legitimation crisis
of late capitalism, he was convinced that in order to sustain itself, modern
capitalism requires democratic support, and that by eroding the redistribu-
tive welfare state, capitalism would progressively destroy this support – and
eventually itself. When much more recently Wolfgang Streeck (2011, 2014)
diagnosed a crisis of democratic capitalism he, too, argued that the ‘stability
and survival of capitalism’ depends on ‘non-capitalist foundations’ that it
rapidly depletes (Streeck 2014, p. 50). Streeck acknowledged that, in the era
of hegemonic neoliberalism, capitalism, to a signiﬁcant extent, has emanci-
pated itself from the need for democratic legitimation. But he believes that
the unresolved tension between the logic of democratic self-determination
and the rule of the market will result in ‘a long and painful period of
cumulative decay’ (Streeck 2014, p. 64) of both capitalism and, in particular,
democracy. Going beyond both Habermas and Streeck, the diagnosis of the
legitimation crisis of democracy takes into account that contemporary con-
sumer societies are witnessing the repackaging of democracy’s normative
core. It recognizes that the ongoing dismantling of the redistributive welfare
state, the dramatic increase in social inequality and the ongoing destruction
of bio-physical systems are, contrary to the predictions of Habermas, Streeck
and many ecologists, are not necessarily perceived as a major societal pro-
blem, but continued and accelerated as a metastatic politics of unsustain-
ability. It acknowledges that in the wake of a still-ongoing value and culture
shift, democracy is getting ever more deeply entangled in ‘complicity’ with
unsustainability.
For the diagnosis of this legitimation crisis of democracy, the observa-
tion of a multi-dimensional dysfunctionality of democracy has been an
important stepping stone. By way of conclusion, it may be helpful to clarify
that as regards emancipatory dysfunctionality, in particular, there is no
intention to make any normative argument for, or even defence of, the
value and culture shift conceptualised here as second-order emancipation.
Instead, the objective is to explore what this shift, to the extent that it has
actually taken place, implies for contemporary democracy and eco-politics.
Thus the diagnosis of an emancipatory dysfunctionality is made only from
the perspective of those understandings of freedom, self-determination,
and self-realisation that, according to Inglehart, Bauman, Reckwitz and
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many others, have become prevalent in contemporary consumer societies.
It is made for analytical purposes only, and does not imply any normative
endorsement. After all, the objective of this analysis has been to better
understand, not to reinforce, the glass ceiling to the eco-state and a socio-
ecological transformation to sustainability. The diagnosis it presents is not
itself based on the norms of second-order emancipation, but on the well
documented empirical observations: that a radical socio-ecological trans-
formation has, as yet, not occurred; of the decline of conﬁdence in demo-
cratic institutions and the spread of anti-democratic sentiments; and of the
right-wing populist repackaging of democratic ideas. From the perspective
of second-order emancipation and the threatened majority this repackaged
democracy might, once again, appear much more functional and legiti-
mate. Yet, it is evident that this democracy is not only the glass ceiling to
any sustainability transformation, but actively reinforces the politics of
unsustainability.
For critical environmental sociology, the dialectic of emancipation, the
multi-dimensional dysfunctionality and the parabola of democracy represent
a fundamental problem. In much of the literature so far, the discussion has
been framed as the struggle between alienating capitalist unsustainability and
emancipatory democratic sustainability, and as the choice between demo-
cratic and authoritarian pathways to sustainability. In contemporary con-
sumer societies, however, in the wake of second-order emancipation, the
project of a socio-ecological transformation has, de facto, been abandoned,
and the remaining choice seems to be between a democratically legitimated
(majoritarian) and a non-democratic (expertocratic, authoritarian) politics
of social and ecological unsustainability. Critical sociology thus seems
stuck – as radical eco-activists are – between a rock and a hard place. For
the time being, it continues to replay its well-known narratives of alienation
and emancipation, democratic renewal and societal transformation.
Understandably, from the perspective of the critical tradition, the idea of
a democratic politics of unsustainability is unbearable. Yet, the refusal to
acknowledge the legitimation crisis of democracy and the ongoing repacka-
ging of its normative core is itself turning into a major obstacle to under-
standing modern consumer societies’ eco-political conundrum.
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